Michelson v. Citicorp Natl Ser by unknown
1998 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-11-1998 
Michelson v. Citicorp Natl Ser 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998 
Recommended Citation 
"Michelson v. Citicorp Natl Ser" (1998). 1998 Decisions. 43. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998/43 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1998 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed March 11, 1998 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 




WILLIAM H. MICHELSON, on behalf of himself and all 
others similarly situated, 




CITICORP NATIONAL SERVICES, INC., 
f/k/a/ CITICORP ACCEPTANCE COMPANY, INC. 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 96-cv-00032) 
 
Argued: October 28, 1997 
 
Before: SLOVITER, NYGAARD and 
KRAVITCH,* Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed March 11, 1998) 
 
Daniel A. Edelman 
Cathleen M. Combs (Argued) 
James O. Latturner 
Jennifer R. Shapiro 
Edelman & Combs 
Chicago, IL 60603 






* Hon. Phyllis A. Kravitch, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the 
Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation. 
  
       Terri A. Mazur (Argued) 
       Victoria R. Collado 
       Mayer, Brown & Platt 
       Chicago, IL 60603 
        Attorneys for Appellee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge, 
 
Appellant William H. Michelson filed a class action 
complaint in the district court of New Jersey against 
Citicorp National Services, Inc. [CNS], a corporation 
headquartered in the State of Missouri, alleging that CNS 
imposed unreasonable early termination fees in connection 
with its consumer automobile leases and that it failed 
adequately to disclose the nature of those fees, in violation 
of the Consumer Leasing Act [CLA], 15 U.S.C. S 1667b,1 
and its implementing regulation.2 Before the court ruled on 
class certification, Michelson sought leave to amend the 
complaint to add 39 additional plaintiffs as additional class 
representatives and filed a new motion for class certification 
based on the proposed amended complaint. The district 
court, relying on the authority of Colorado River Water 
Conservation Distr. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), 
denied Michelson's motion, denied certification of a plaintiff 
class, and sua sponte stayed Michelson's individual claim 
pending the resolution of a related state court action in 
Missouri. Michelson appeals from that order. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The relevant statutory section, generally termed the "reasonableness" 
provision, states: 
 
        Penalties or other charges for delinquency, default, or early 
       termination may be specified in the lease but only at an amount 
       which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm 
       caused by the delinquency, default, or early termination, the 
       difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or 
nonfeasibility of 
       otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 1667b(b). 
 
2. The disclosure requirements are contained in 12 C.F.R. S 213. 
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The thrust of Michelson's argument on appeal is that the 
district court misapplied the Colorado River doctrine 
because the federal and state actions involve different 
parties and are not truly "parallel." Appellee CNS concedes 
that the Colorado River doctrine would not be applicable to 
certain elements of Michelson's case but argues that the 
district court's order was entered only in part pursuant to 
Colorado River and is not a final order. Accordingly, CNS 
contends that this court lacks jurisdiction over Michelson's 




The convoluted procedural history of this case began on 
May 6, 1991 when Merrilou Kedziora3 filed a class action 
against CNS in Illinois state court. The complaint alleged, 
inter alia, that the manner in which CNS calculated early 
automobile lease termination fees and charges, known as 
the Rule of 78s or the Sum-of-the-Digits method, invariably 
favored the lessor and was unreasonable. In addition, the 
complaint alleged that CNS inadequately disclosed the 
effect of its use of the Rule of 78s in its lease agreements. 
That suit, premised on the CLA, the Missouri 
Merchandising Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. SS 407.010, et 
seq., [MMPA] and Illinois state law, was removed to the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois on June 4, 1991. 
 
On November 21, 1991, before a plaintiff class was 
certified, the district court in Illinois granted CNS's motion 
to dismiss the disclosure claims under the CLA for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See 
Kedziora v. Citicorp Nat'l. Servs., Inc., 780 F. Supp. 516, 
529-31 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aff 'd in relevant part, Channell v. 
Citicorp Nat'l. Servs. Inc., 89 F.3d 379, 383 (7th Cir. 1996). 
This left pending the plaintiffs' claims under state law and 
their claim that CNS's use of the Rule of 78s was 
unreasonable under the CLA. Several months later, in 
March of 1992, the Illinois plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed 
their state law claims, and refiled their MMPA claim in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Originally, Thomas Kedziora was also named as a plaintiff but he 
dropped out of the suit during the pendency. 
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Missouri state court. The latter claim alleged that the use 
of the Rule of 78s to determine early termination 
deficiencies was unreasonable under Missouri law. The 
corresponding federal claim under the CLA was not 
asserted in the Missouri action, however, because that 
claim was still pending in federal court in Illinois. The 
Missouri state court complaint pleaded only an opt-in class 
action. Michelson, the plaintiff here, did not opt in. 
 
On October 15, 1992, a plaintiff class was certified in the 
action pending in federal court in Illinois consisting of all 
those with private automobile leases assigned to CNS as 
defined in the complaint and who were assessed early 
termination or default deficiencies. See Kedziora, No. 91 C 
3428, 1992 WL 300982 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 15, 1992). Michelson 
was a member of that class. Supp. App. at 101. Several 
years later, the district court in Illinois narrowed the scope 
of the plaintiff class. See Kedziora, 883 F. Supp. 1155 (N.D. 
Ill. 1995). It found that Kedziora's lease was terminated 
involuntarily and that CNS did not employ the Rule of 78s 
in cases of involuntary termination. Thus, the court 
concluded that Kedziora, the named plaintiff in that case, 
did not have standing to pursue the claims of the members 
who had terminated their leases voluntarily and were 
challenging the reasonableness of the Rule of 78s. Id. at 
1159-60. This had the effect of excluding many former class 
members, including Michelson. Consequently, as of the 
date of that ruling, Michelson was not a party to any 
relevant litigation pending in any court. 
 
On January 5, 1996, Michelson, a New Jersey resident, 
filed the class action complaint in the case at bar in the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. 
He alleged that in April of 1988 he had leased a new Eagle 
Premier LX for 48-months. Under the lease, Michelson's 
payments totaled $14,472, including a finance charge or 
"lease charge" of $4,263.84. In September of 1991, he 
terminated the lease because, according to him, the car was 
a "lemon." CNS then determined that Michelson still owed 
$1,814.49 in remaining payments (calculated pursuant to 
the Rule of 78s) and $5,221.29 for the residual value of the 
car. Michelson claims he paid the $1,814.49 in remaining 
payments upon termination. CNS then sold the car at 
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auction for $4,040, applied the proceeds toward 
Michelson's ultimate liability and sought only $1,171.29 
from him. Michelson contested that amount but forwarded 
to CNS "under protest" a check for $500 "to settle this 
account. . . for [the] residual value on the resale." 
 
Michelson's complaint, as amended, alleged in Count One 
that CNS violated the CLA's disclosure provisions for failing 
to explain the Rule of 78s and in Count Two that CNS's 
practice of calculating early termination charges using the 
Rule of 78s was unreasonable under the CLA. Michelson 
asserted no claim under the MMPA or any other state 
statute. 
 
In May of 1996, Michelson moved to certify a plaintiff 
class of those lessees who were assessed charges for early 
termination, delinquency or default. Before ruling on that 
motion, the district court turned its attention to CNS's 
pending motion to dismiss, and granted the motion with 
respect to Count One of the second amended complaint (the 
disclosure count) but denied the motion with respect to 
Count Two (the "reasonableness" claim). 
 
Thereafter, at a pretrial conference with the magistrate 
judge on October 23, 1996, CNS argued that Michelson's 
$500 payment operated as a settlement of his claim, which 
jeopardized his standing to lead the proposed class of 
approximately 3,000 plaintiffs. Although Michelson 
disputed the issue and the issue was not resolved, the 
magistrate judge entered an order on October 29, 1996 
giving Michelson leave to join an additional proposed class 
representative. Consequently, Michelson's third amended 
complaint proposed the addition of 39 new plaintiffs. CNS 
opposed the amendment, arguing that because all 39 
proposed plaintiffs were class members in the Missouri 
state court litigation, denial of the amendment was 
appropriate under the doctrine enunciated by the Supreme 
Court in Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United 
States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). CNS did not challenge the 
maintenance of Michelson's individual claim. 
 
The district court held a hearing on the proposed 
amendment on March 10, 1997. At that time, the court 
expressed concern that although the New Jersey action was 
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based on the federal statute and the pending Missouri state 
court action was based on Missouri state law, it appeared 
that the question of the reasonableness of the Rule of 78s 
was the primary issue in both actions and the damages 
sought in both actions were essentially the same. Michelson 
sought to distinguish the actions on the grounds that 
statutory damages were available in the federal action 
whereas only compensatory and punitive damages were 
available in the Missouri action. He also contended that the 
ruling in Missouri would not be dispositive of his action. 
Without deciding the res judicata issue raised by CNS as 
one of the bases for its contention that the 39 proposed 
plaintiffs were inappropriate class representatives, the court 
commented that Michelson's individual action would 
remain even if the 39 proposed plaintiffs were eventually 
barred after completion of the Missouri action. Likewise, 
the court recognized that other potential members of the 
New Jersey class who were not parties to the Missouri 
action would not be barred by a Missouri judgment. 
 
The court denied the motion to amend the complaint to 
add the 39 proposed plaintiffs and the motion for class 
certification, and stayed proceedings on Michelson's 
individual claim pending resolution of the Missouri action. 
It delivered an oral opinion, stating at the outset: "I find 
that the basic thrust of the determination I am about to 
make is controlled by Colorado River Water Conservation 
Dis. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)." Supp. App. 
at 124. After discussing Colorado River, the court 
concluded: 
 
        So it seems as though most, if not all, of the 
       applicable Colorado River factors would cause me to 
       dismiss or stay this matter, and I do this by way of a 
       qualitative rather than quantitative analysis. It is not a 
       mechanical checklist, but we do it weighing these 
       factors qualitatively. I find this matter should be 
       dismissed under the Colorado River Doctrine, and 
       therefore, the motion to amend the complaint is 
       denied, and the motion for class certification is denied. 
 
        With regard to what is left, we will stay Mr. 
       Michaelson's [sic] matter pending resolution in 
       Missouri and see what happens out there. He has the 
 
                                6 
  
       option, if he wishes, to jump ship there, to board that 
       other steamship in Missouri, I suppose, but I am not 
       making findings as to that. 
 
Supp. App. at 129. 
 
On appeal, Michelson argues that the Colorado River 
doctrine is inapplicable on the facts of this case, and that 
therefore the order entering the stay should be reversed. In 
addition, he argues that the denial of class certification 
should be reversed because it had "the effect" of 
erroneously staying the claims of the potential class 
members under Colorado River and was an abuse of 
discretion. We note that Michelson has not specifically 
listed as an issue presented on appeal the question whether 
the court erred in denying the motion to amend the 
complaint. Nevertheless, Michelson argues in his reply brief 
that he is also appealing the denial of his motion to amend 
the complaint and that that issue was preserved in his 






We turn to consider whether we have jurisdiction over 
any portion of the order Michelson has appealed. It is well- 
settled that orders granting or denying motions to add 
parties are not "final" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. In McClune v. Shamah, 593 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 
1979), this court, after noting that plaintiffs had not 
appealed from the district court's denial of their motion to 
amend the complaint to add a party, commented "nor could 
they [have appealed] since it is not a final order appealable 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1291." Id. at 486. More recently we 
quoted the statement from a decision of the Tenth Circuit 
that " `although an order refusing or permitting the filing of 
an amended complaint joining an additional party is a 
discretionary action by the trial court and subject to 
appellate review as part of an ultimate final judgment, the 
order itself is not appealable in isolation.' " Fowler v. Merry, 
468 F.2d 242, 243 (10th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (quoted in 
Powers v. Southland Corp., 4 F.3d 223, 232 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
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The Fowler court also stated that denial of an amendment 
does not "present[ ] a situation indicating allowable review 
under the exceptional doctrine of Cohen . . .," Fowler, 468 
F.2d at 243, a view with which we also agreed. Powers, 4 
F.3d at 232. 
 
Similarly, it has been firmly established for nearly two 
decades that orders granting or denying class certification 
are not appealable before a final order is issued. See 
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469-71 (1978) 
(order denying class certification was not a final order 
under the `death knell' doctrine nor was it appealable as a 
collateral order); Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 83 F.3d 
610, 624 (3d Cir. 1996), aff'd, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997); 
Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pennsylvania, 7 F.3d 332, 338 n.9 
(3d Cir. 1993). 
 
Accordingly, our jurisdiction at this juncture to review 
the district court's denial of Michelson's motion to amend 
the complaint and its denial of class certification will 
depend on whether the district court's stay of Michelson's 




We consider then whether that portion of the district 
court's order staying Michelson's individual claim pending 
the resolution of the Missouri action was "final" within the 
meaning of 28 U.S.C. S 1291. In order to determine whether 
the stay order is final, we must look to its effect. See 
Aluminum Co. of America v. Beazer East, Inc., 124 F.3d 551, 
557 (3d Cir. 1997); Marcus v. Township of Abington, 38 
F.3d 1367, 1370 (3d Cir. 1994). The effect of afinal order 
is typically two-fold. First, it will dispose of all claims 
presented to the district court and, second, it will leave 
"nothing further for the district court to do." Aluminum Co. 
of America, 124 F.3d at 557 (citing Catlin v. United States, 
324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)). See also Quackenbush v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 116 S. Ct. 1712, 1718 (1996) (stating that a 
decision is ordinarily considered final and appealable under 
S 1291 only if it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves 
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment); 
Christy v. Horn, 115 F.3d 201, 203 (3d Cir. 1997). Thus, 
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"there is no final order if claims remain unresolved and 
their resolution is to occur in the district court." Aluminum 
Co. of America, 124 F.3d at 557. 
 
The issue of whether and under what circumstances a 
stay order may be considered final and appealable has 
spawned a considerable body of case law. Of course, by 
definition an order that stays the proceedings for a finite 
period of time, would, without more, merely postpone a 
final disposition in the district court, and therefore would 
lack the essential elements of finality. Thus, in Moses H. 
Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 
(1983), Justice Brennan referred to "the usual rule that a 
stay is not ordinarily a final decision for purposes of 
S 1291, since most stays do not put the plaintiff effectively 
out of court." Id. at 10 n.11 (internal quotations omitted). 
This court has had numerous occasions to iterate that 
principle. See Marcus, 38 F.3d at 1370 ("Stay orders 
normally are not appealable final orders because they 
merely delay proceedings in the suit."); Schall v. Joyce, 885 
F.2d 101, 104 (3d Cir. 1989) (recognizing that Moses H. 
Cone "reaffirm[ed] the usual rule that a stay is not 
ordinarily a final decision for purposes of S 1291") (citations 
omitted). 
 
Not all stays fall within this general rule. In Moses H. 
Cone, the Court reasoned that where a stay order has the 
practical effect of a dismissal, a reviewing court may treat 
it as final. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 9-10. The particular 
stay in that case was one entered pursuant to Colorado 
River, sometimes referred to as the Colorado River 
abstention doctrine, under which a federal court may, in 
exceptional circumstances, dismiss a federal suit"due to 
the presence of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of 
wise judicial administration." Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 
818. 
 
The Moses H. Cone case arose when the contractor for a 
construction project for a hospital requested arbitration of 
its dispute with the hospital, as provided for in the 
contract. The hospital sought a declaratory judgment in 
state court that there was no right to arbitration. The 
contractor filed a diversity action in federal court to compel 
arbitration under section 4 of the Arbitration Act. The 
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district court stayed the federal proceedings pursuant to 
the Colorado River doctrine, and the contractor appealed. 
The Court of Appeals held it had jurisdiction over the 
appeal and reversed. The Supreme Court upheld the 
exercise of appellate jurisdiction by the Court of Appeals. 
After acknowledging the general rule that stays are not final 
orders for purposes of appeal, the Court held that the stay 
in that case was final and appealable because"a stay of the 
federal suit pending resolution of the state suit meant that 
there would be no further litigation in the federal forum; 
the state court's judgment on the issue [of arbitrability] 
would be res judicata." Id. at 10. 
 
The Court enunciated what has since been recognized as 
one of the principal exceptions to the nonappealability of a 
stay order: when a stay forces the plaintiff "effectively out of 
federal court" by requiring "all or an essential part of the 
federal suit to be litigated in a state forum" or"when the 
sole purpose and effect of the stay is precisely to surrender 
jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state court," the order is 
final and appealable. Id. at 10 n.11. Supreme Court 
decisions both before and after Moses H. Cone have 
sustained the appealability of district court orders declining 
to exercise jurisdiction under various abstention doctrines. 
See Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epsteen, 370 U.S. 713, 715 n.2 
(1962) (per curiam) (court of appeals "properly rejected" 
argument that district court order effectively staying an 
action for the same reasons underlying Pullman abstention 
was not final); Quackenbush, 116 S. Ct. at 1719-20 (order 
remanding to state court on grounds of Burford abstention 
was final). 
 
Following the decision in Moses H. Cone, this court has 
consistently applied the finality analysis articulated there in 
determining our own jurisdiction to hear appeals from 
orders staying federal cases in deference to actions 
proceeding simultaneously in state court. See , e.g., Marcus, 
38 F.3d at 1370; Trent v. Dial Medical of Florida, Inc., 33 
F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 1994); Schall, 885 F.2d at 104-05; 
Cheyney State College Faculty v. Hufstedler, 703 F.2d 732, 
735-36 (3d Cir. 1983). That analysis usually has entailed 
an inquiry into the effect of the district court's stay to 
ascertain whether the court has surrendered its jurisdiction 
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to a state court. This necessitates comparing the nature of 
the claims presented in the two actions and considering the 
extent to which the state court judgment will impact on the 
federal action. See generally, Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 9- 
13; Marcus, 38 F.3d at 1370-72; Trent, 33 F.3d at 220-22; 
Schall, 885 F.2d at 104-05; Cheyney, 703 F.2d at 735-36. 
 
Michelson makes the broader argument that all stays 
entered pursuant to the Colorado River doctrine are 
appealable final orders. Although at first blush this appears 
to be an expansion of finality, further consideration 
suggests that Michelson's contention is not without basis, 
although he cites no case that has articulated the rule in 
precisely that manner. Examination of Moses H. Cone and 
the cases thereafter support the view that if the stay 
entered by the district court meets the threshold 
requirements of the Colorado River doctrine, i.e. the state 
proceeding for which the federal case has been stayed is in 
fact parallel in parties and claims and will have res judicata 
effect on all or an important part of the subsequent federal 
case, then the order is appealable. The difficulty in 
application arises in considering the appealability of a stay 
when the district court has merely invoked the Colorado 
River doctrine to justify the stay order entered, but the 
circumstances of the case do not correspond with the 
parameters of that doctrine. In that situation, there would 
be no appellate jurisdiction. 
 
Our decision in Marcus serves as an illustration of the 
point. In that case, a plaintiff who sued a township and 
local officials under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 appealed from a stay 
pending the resolution of a related criminal proceeding, 
nominally entered pursuant to the Colorado River doctrine. 
Marcus, 38 F.3d at 1370. In dismissing the appeal for want 
of jurisdiction, we stated that notwithstanding the district 
court's invocation of Colorado River, "[a]ppellate review is 
inappropriate here because the stay entered by the district 
court merely delays the federal litigation and does not 
effectively terminate it." Id. Specifically, we noted that the 
state court judgment would have no res judicata effect on 
the federal litigation and that "[o]nce the stay is lifted, the 
state court's disposition of the criminal proceeding will have 
a negligible impact on the subsequent federal adjudication." 
Id. at 1371. We then explained further that: 
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        We realize, of course, that most stay orders entered 
       upon the authority of Colorado River Water 
       Conservation Dist. v. United States, are subject to 
       immediate appellate review. As the Supreme Court 
       pointed out in Moses H. Cone, the Colorado River 
       doctrine applies only if there is parallel state court 
       litigation involving the same parties and issues that 
       will completely and finally resolve the issues between 
       the parties and, accordingly, a "decision to invoke 
       Colorado River, necessarily contemplates that the 
       federal court will have nothing further to do in 
       resolving any substantive part of the [federal] case, 
       whether it stays or dismisses." In other words, because 
       of the requirement of a parallel state court proceeding, 
       stays entered under the authority of Colorado River will 
       normally have the effect of putting the plaintiff 
       "effectively out of federal court" and surrendering 
       jurisdiction to the state tribunal. 
 
        In this case, the district court cited Colorado River in 
       support of its decision to stay the proceedings before it. 
       But our jurisdiction does not turn on the authority 
       cited by the district court. It turns, rather, on the effect 
       of the order that the district court had entered. If that 
       order has deprived the federal plaintiff of a federal 
       adjudication to which he or she may be entitled, it is 
       a final order under Moses H. Cone and subject to 
       immediate appellate review. If, as here, the order only 
       serves to delay the federal adjudication, it is notfinal 
       and not appealable. 
 
Marcus, 38 F.3d at 1371-72 (internal citations and footnote 
omitted). After Marcus then, it is clear that the justification 
for the stay articulated by the district court is not 
determinative of our appellate jurisdiction, nor could it be. 
Id. 
 
The distinction between the appealability of a Colorado 
River stay and a stay that merely delays the federal 
litigation is borne out by review of other leading cases. 
Those which have sustained appellate jurisdiction were all 
cases in which the essential elements of the Colorado River 
doctrine were present, i.e. parallel parties and parallel 
claims as well as a realistic possibility that the federal 
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action would thereafter be precluded. See, e.g., Wilton v. 
Seven Falls Co., 115 S. Ct. 2137 (1995) (reviewing Colorado 
River stay where district court contemplated that state 
court would resolve all issues); Trent, 33 F.3d at 225 
(holding that court had jurisdiction over appeal from 
Colorado River stay where all or essential part of plaintiff 's 
case would proceed in state court); National R.R. Passenger 
Corp. v. Providence & W.R.R., 798 F.2d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 1986) 
(appellate jurisdiction existed over Colorado River stay 
because res judicata effect of state judgment would render 
stay "the equivalent of a dismissal"). See generally 15A 
Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 
S 3914.13 (2d ed. 1992) (citing cases). 
 
On the other hand, cases where, despite nominal 
reference to Colorado River by the district court, the federal 
plaintiff would not be precluded from proceeding with the 
federal claim in due course have been held unappealable. 
See, e.g., Marcus, 38 F.3d at 1371; cf. United States v. 
Section 17 Township 23 North, 40 F.3d 320, 322 (10th Cir. 
1994) (action stayed in deference to state court proceeding 
not final in the usual sense absent threat of res judicata 
effect); Boushel v. Toro Co., 985 F.2d 406, 410 (8th Cir. 
1993) (stay entered pending foreign litigation notfinal 
because the "substance of the order did not effectively end 
the federal litigation" and "further proceedings in the 
federal court" were ensured if necessary). 
 
It is important to emphasize the limited extent to which 
stays are appealable. In Quackenbush, the Court 
characterized the result in Moses H. Cone as having been 
compelled by precedent that was " `limited to cases where 
(under Colorado River, abstention, or a closely similar 
doctrine) the object of the stay is to require all or an 
essential part of the federal suit to be litigated in a state 
forum,' " 116 S. Ct. at 1719 (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 
U.S. at 10 n.11) (emphasis added). Similarly, this court 
stated in Trent that "[i]n Moses H. Cone, the Supreme Court 
held that a stay grounded in the pendency of similar 
litigation in state court is appealable if it `effectively 
deprive[s] the plaintiff of its right to a federal forum. . . .' " 
33 F.3d at 221 (emphasis added). 
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Thus, the task of the appellate court when presented 
with what is ostensibly a Colorado River stay is to make an 
initial decision whether the stay may have a determinative 
effect on the federal suit. If it is arguable that the stay will 
place a plaintiff such as Michelson effectively out of federal 
court by forcing him or her to rely on a state court 
judgment, then it is appealable under the authority of 
Moses H. Cone. 
 
We recognize that in one sense, the decision as to 
appealability of a stay may be seen as a preview of the 
issues that will inform the ultimate decision on the 
appropriateness of the stay itself. However, once the 
appeals court takes jurisdiction, it will have the opportunity 
to examine in detail all of the factors relevant to the 
decision that "exceptional circumstances" justified the 
district court in abstaining from exercising "its unflagging 
obligation" to hear the case. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 
817. See also Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 16. The appeals 
court will then be in a position to decide whether the court 
abused its discretion in entering the stay. 
 
Significantly, both parties to the instant appeal agree that 
the resolution of the Missouri action will have little or no 
effect on Michelson's individual claim in federal court. As 
Michelson concedes, "a finding in the Missouri state action 
here resolves nothing for the [federal] trial court. The 
Missouri state court's holding on Missouri State law 
certainly does not bind, and may not even aid the trial 
court here with its determination of federal law." Reply Br. 
at 3. 
 
It follows that we cannot characterize the stay as 
equivalent to a dismissal. Because Michelson is not a party 
to the Missouri action, once that action is resolved and the 
stay is lifted, he will not be precluded from proceeding with 
his federal claims by principles of res judicata. Similarly, 
because the state court action is premised only on Missouri 
law, whereas Michelson's federal suit is based exclusively 
on the federal CLA, a determination of the reasonableness 
of particular fees and penalties under Missouri law will not 
be determinative of the similar issue in Michelson's federal 
suit. See Wiskup v. Liberty Buick Co., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 
958, 969 (N.D. Ill. 1997) ("Given the wide variation among 
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the states regarding the permissibility of the Rule of 78s, 
importing a state standard into the CLA would simply 
create confusion."). Thus, regardless of the result in the 
Missouri action, the stay order will not have the type of 
legal or practical effect as to thrust Michelson's federal CLA 
claim "effectively out of court." Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 
10. 
 
Indeed, it appears from the argument in the district court 
that the court did not expect Michelson's federal claim to be 
disposed of by the Missouri action unless Michelson were to 
opt into the Missouri class -- something Michelson has 
never displayed any inclination to do. The court rejected 
CNS's argument that the entire federal action would"fall[ ] 
apart" after judgment was rendered in Missouri, and 
reminded counsel that "[i]t doesn't fall apart" because, 
assuming Michelson is not deemed to have settled with 
CNS, Michelson's individual claim would remain. Thus, 
although the district court did not make its reasoning 
explicit, there is nothing to suggest that the court was 
intentionally surrendering its jurisdiction to the state court 
rather than merely imposing a finite delay. And certainly, 
there is nothing to suggest that Michelson could not return 
to the district court to request that the stay be lifted before 
the Missouri action is resolved. 
 
Accordingly, regardless of the authority cited when the 
district court entered the stay, the court's order will not 
and clearly was not intended to foreclose Michelson from 
presenting any of his claims in federal court and therefore 
is not a final judgment on the merits. See Marcus, 38 F.3d 
at 1371 ("The `mere prospect of delay' does not create 
appellate jurisdiction where it would not otherwise exist.") 
(quoting Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 587 F.2d 1340, 1347 (3d 
Cir. 1978)). 
 
This case illustrates the problem that an appellate court 
faces when considering whether it has jurisdiction over an 
appeal of a stay when the basis for the stay is not clearly 
articulated by the district court. CNS emphasizes that it 
never asked that Michelson's individual claim be stayed 
under Colorado River, and agrees with Michelson that 
application of that doctrine would be erroneous. Appellee's 
Br. at 10. It argues that the district court did not find that 
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Michelson's individual claim should be stayed under 
Colorado River and only relied on that doctrine in denying 
leave to amend the complaint. Admittedly, neither party 
offers a cogent basis for the stay, and the district court's 
oral opinion is somewhat ambiguous on this point. In light 
of our ultimate decision that we lack jurisdiction, we do not 
address that issue, although we share with our colleague 
Judge Garth the frustration of being "prohibited from 
reviewing . . . those Colorado River abstention rulings 
involving state and federal proceedings that are neither 
parallel nor identical, and which are thus erroneous." 
Marcus, 38 F.3d at 1374 (dissenting opinion). That 
frustration, however, is the price the judicial system exacts 





Michelson suggests that we have appellate jurisdiction to 
review the stay order under the collateral order doctrine, 
the alternate approach to finality enunciated by the 
Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 
337 U.S. 541 (1949). Under that "narrow exception" we may 
review an order before final judgment on the merits that 
"(1) finally resolves a disputed question; (2) raises an 
important issue distinct from the merits of the case; and (3) 
is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." 
Christy, 115 F.3d at 203-04. See also Quackenbush, 116 S. 
Ct. at 1718; In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 958 (3d 
Cir. 1997). All three elements must be satisfied. Christy, 
115 F.3d at 204. 
 
We need not address the first and third elements because 
it is clear that the district court's stay order does not satisfy 
the second element. On one hand, a stay order "that 
amounts to a refusal to adjudicate the merits plainly 
presents an important issue separate from the merits." 
Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 12. Thus, where a plaintiff 
cannot return to federal court following the resolution of 
the state court action, the stay amounts to a refusal by the 
district court to address the merits of the federal action, 
and the importance and separability prong of the collateral 
order doctrine is satisfied. Id.; cf. Quackenbush, 116 S. Ct. 
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at 1719-20 (holding that remand order based on Burford 
abstention doctrine was an appealable collateral order, by 
analogy to treatment of Colorado River stay in Moses H. 
Cone ); Terra Nova, 887 F.2d at 1220 (stay entered in favor 
of state court proceeding satisfied "importance" element 
where stay had the practical effect of foreclosing litigation 
in federal court). 
 
On the other hand, if the stay reflects merely the district 
court's imposition of a finite period of delay before the court 
completes its adjudication, the importance prong of the 
Cohen test is not satisfied. In our decision in Rolo v. 
General Development Corp., 949 F.2d 695 (3d Cir. 1991), a 
case not directly implicating the Colorado River  doctrine, we 
analogized to the Colorado River cases and distinguished 
between stay orders that effectively terminate the litigation, 
as in Moses H. Cone, and those that merely impose delay. 
Id. at 701. With respect to the latter, we reasoned that "[i]t 
does not follow [from Moses H. Cone] that an order which 
does no more than establish the timetable for litigating the 
merits of a controversy resolves an important issue 
completely separate from the merits." Rolo, 949 F.2d at 701 
(internal quotations omitted). Subsequently in Marcus, 38 
F.3d at 1371 n.4, we held that our reasoning in Rolo was 
also applicable to stays entered pursuant to Colorado River. 
 
As we detailed above, regardless of the outcome in the 
state litigation Michelson's individual claim in federal court 
will remain substantially, perhaps entirely, unaffected. 
Thus, because "there will be further proceedings of 
substance in the district court," Rolo, 949 F.2d at 701, after 
the Missouri action is concluded, the district court's stay 
order fails to satisfy the "importance" prong of the collateral 





For the reasons set forth, we conclude that we have no 
jurisdiction over the order of the district court denying 
Michelson's motion to certify a class, denying leave to 
amend the complaint to add additional plaintiffs, and 
staying the proceedings. The fact that we find the order 
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unappealable does not mean that an indefinite stay entered 
for no supportable reason, in this or any other case, is 
insulated from appellate review. Mandamus remains an 
available remedy in appropriate cases. See Cheyney State 
College Faculty, 703 F.2d at 736; Crotty v. City of Chicago 
Heights, 857 F.2d 1170, 1174 n.10 (7th Cir. 1988). We 
express no opinion as to whether this is an appropriate 
case for mandamus. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal. 
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